Politically Connected Independent Directors and the Cost of Debt:Evidence from Chinese Main-Board Listed Firms by 颜思铭
	   
学校编码：10384                                分类号  密级      














Politically Connected Independent Directors and the Cost of 
Debt: Evidence from Chinese Main-Board Listed Firms 
	  
颜 思 铭 
 
指导教师姓名：王荔红 副教授 
专  业 名 称：财    务   学 
论文提交日期：2 0 1 6 年 3 月 
论文答辩时间：2 0 1 6 年 5 月 




评    阅    人： 
 



















另外，该学位论文为（                            ）课题（组）
的研究成果，获得（               ）课题（组）经费或实验室的




  声明人（签名）： 





























（     ）1.经厦门大学保密委员会审查核定的保密学位论文，
于   年  月  日解密，解密后适用上述授权。 







                             声明人（签名）： 
年   月   日 













摘	   	   要	  
	   I	  









































	   II	  
 ABSTRACT  	  
As an informal system, political connections are prevalent and have facilitated 
firms to get easier access to resources and preferential treatment. Since introduced 
into China, the independent director has become a channel by which firms try to 
establish political connections. In Chinese market, except for independent directors’ 
supervision function, listed firms also focus on their social resource network. There 
has been a mass of literature on how political connections and independent directors 
affect firm behavior and performance, but less of them study the impact of political 
connectedness on firms’ debt financing scale and cost of debt in terms of independent 
directors. 
Taking China’s special institutional features into consideration, this paper 
employs samples of main-board firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange from 2003 to 2014 and empirically investigates how politically connected 
independent directors exert influence on firms’ leverage and the cost of debt. More 
specifically, we try to examine whether this influence differs in state-owned 
enterprises and private firms. Additionally, this paper tests how the interaction of 
financial development and politically connected independent directors affects the cost 
of debt. 
The empirical test indicates that politically connected independent directors can 
improve firms’ leverage ratio and costs of debt. Considering the firm’s ownership, 
this political connectedness can increase leverage ratios both in private and 
state-owned firms while the increasing effect of politically connected independent 
directors on the cost of debt is more significant in private firms than that in 
state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, the increasing effect of political connections on 
costs of debt is strengthened in regions with less financial development and this effect 
is evident in private firms. These findings imply that politically connected 
independent directors can help firms mitigate financing constraint and meanwhile 
they can raise agency costs, lower the quality of accounting information and corporate 
governance, resulting in higher cost of debt. 
Base on the framework of agency theory and resource dependent theory, this 
paper studies how politically connected independent directors affect firm debt 
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connections and debt financing. 
 













目	   	   录	  
	   IV	  
目  录 
摘  要 	  ..................................................................................................................................	  I	  
第 1 章  绪  论 	  ...........................................................................................................	  1	  
1.1 研究背景 	  .............................................................................................................................	  1	  
1.2 研究意义 	  .............................................................................................................................	  3	  
1.3 研究内容 	  .............................................................................................................................	  3	  
1.4 创新点 	  ..................................................................................................................................	  4	  
第 2 章 文献综述 	  .........................................................................................................	  6	  
2.1 独立董事相关文献 	  ........................................................................................................	  6	  
2.1.1 独立董事制度有效性	  ..........................................................................................................	  6	  
2.1.2 独立董事与公司绩效	  ..........................................................................................................	  7	  
2.1.3 独立董事个人特质和背景	  ................................................................................................	  8	  
2.1.4 独立董事行为的信息传递	  ................................................................................................	  9	  
2.2 政治关联相关文献 	  ........................................................................................................	  9	  
2.2.1 政治关联的正面效应	  ..........................................................................................................	  9	  
2.2.2 政治关联的负面效应	  ........................................................................................................	  10	  
2.2.3 政治关联与独立董事	  ........................................................................................................	  11	  
2.3 债务融资成本相关文献 	  ...........................................................................................	  12	  
2.3.1 公司治理与债务融资成本	  ..............................................................................................	  12	  
2.3.2 政治关联与债务融资成本	  ..............................................................................................	  13	  
2.4 文献评述 	  ..........................................................................................................................	  13	  
第 3 章  相关理论分析与假设提出 	  .............................................................	  14	  
3.1 理论基础 	  ..........................................................................................................................	  14	  
3.1.1 信息不对称理论	  ...................................................................................................................	  14	  
3.1.2 委托代理理论	  ........................................................................................................................	  14	  
3.1.3 资源依赖理论	  ........................................................................................................................	  15	  
3.2 假设提出 	  ..........................................................................................................................	  16	  
第 4 章  研究设计与方法 	  ...................................................................................	  20	  
4.1 数据来源与样本说明 	  ................................................................................................	  20	  
4.2 变量界定 	  ..........................................................................................................................	  20	  













目	   	   录	  
	   V	  
4.2.2 解释变量	  ...................................................................................................................................	  20	  
4.2.3 控制变量	  ...................................................................................................................................	  21	  
4.3 模型构建 	  ..........................................................................................................................	  23	  
第 5 章  实证结果与分析 	  ...................................................................................	  25	  
5.1 描述性统计 	  .....................................................................................................................	  25	  
5.2 相关系数检验 	  ................................................................................................................	  26	  
5.3 实证回归结果与分析 	  ................................................................................................	  28	  
5.3.1 单因素分析	  ..............................................................................................................................	  28	  
5.3.2 多元回归分析	  ........................................................................................................................	  29	  
5.4 稳健性检验 	  .....................................................................................................................	  36	  
第 6 章  结论与未来研究方向 	  ........................................................................	  40	  
6.1 主要结论 	  ..........................................................................................................................	  40	  
6.2 本文的贡献与局限性 	  ................................................................................................	  40	  
6.3 未来研究方向 	  ................................................................................................................	  41	  
参考文献： 	  ...................................................................................................................	  42	  














	   VI	  
Contents 
Abstract	  ................................................................................................................................	  I	  
Chaper 1 Introduction .......................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Research Background ............................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Reserach Meanings .................................................................................................... 3 
1.3 Research Contents ..................................................................................................... 3 
1.4 Innovation .................................................................................................................... 4 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 	  .................................................................................	  6 
2.1 Independent Directors .............................................................................................. 6 
2.1.1 Efficiency of Independent Director .................................................................... 6 
2.1.2 Independent Directors and Firm Performance .................................................. 7 
2.1.3 Characters and Backgrounds of Independent Directors .................................. 8 
2.1.4 Information Transmission of Independent Director Behavior ....................... 9 
2.2 Political Connections ................................................................................................. 9 
2.2.1 Positive Effects ..................................................................................................... 9 
2.2.2 Negative Effects .................................................................................................. 10 
2.2.3 Political Connections and Independent Directors .......................................... 11 
2.3 Cost of Debt ............................................................................................................... 12 
2.3.1 Corporate Governance and Cost of Debt ........................................................ 14 
2.3.2 Political Connections and the Cost of Debt .................................................... 15 
2.4 Literature Summary ................................................................................................ 16 
Chapter 3 Related Theories and Hypothese Development .................... 14 
3.1 Related Theories ....................................................................................................... 14 
3.1.1 Information Assymetry Theory ........................................................................ 14 
3.1.2 Principal-Agent Theory ..................................................................................... 14 
3.1.3 Resource Dependence Theory .......................................................................... 15 
3.2 Hypothese Development ......................................................................................... 16 
Chapter 4 Research Design ............................................................................... 20 
4.1 Data and Sample Selection ..................................................................................... 20 
4.2 Variables .................................................................................................................... 20 














	   VII	  
4.2.2 Explanatory Variables ........................................................................................ 20 
4.2.3 Control Variables ................................................................................................ 21 
4.3 Models ......................................................................................................................... 23 
Chapter 5 Empirical Results ............................................................................. 25 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................................ 25 
5.2 Pair-wise Correlation Test ..................................................................................... 26 
5.3 Regression Analysis ................................................................................................. 28 
5.3.1 Univariate Tests .................................................................................................. 28 
5.3.2 Multi-Regression Tests ...................................................................................... 29 
5.4 Robust Checks .......................................................................................................... 36 
Chapter 6 Conclusions ........................................................................................ 40 
6.1 Main Findings ........................................................................................................... 40 
6.2 Main Contribution and Limitaions ...................................................................... 40 
6.3 Future Research Directions ................................................................................... 41 
References ................................................................................................................ 42 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................... 49 













第 1 章	   	   绪	   	   论	  
1	  	  	  
	  

























	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













第 1 章	   	   绪	   	   论	  











































第 1 章	   	   绪	   	   论	  










































第 1 章	   	   绪	   	   论	  











































第 1 章	   	   绪	   	   论	  



































第 2 章	   文献综述	  
6	  	  	  




















管，所以当 CEO 参与提名董事时，独立董事在董事会的比例会有一定程度的下降。 
在中国这样一个转型经济的国家，股权集中，投资者保护制度薄弱。企业处
于这样一个特殊制度环境中，除了存在第一代理问题外，控股股东与小股东之间
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